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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Re Application of:

Tom R. Vandermeijden, et al.

Application No.: 09/945,414

Filed: August 31, 2001

For: Method and Apparatus for Using Caller  
ID Information In A Browser Of A  
Mobile Communication Device

Mail Stop Amendment  
Commissioner for Patents  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Examiner: MD S. Elahee

Art Unit: 2645

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RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION

Technology Center 2600

Sir:

In response to the Office Action dated March 31, 2004, please reconsider the  
present application in view of the following remarks. No claims have been canceled,  
amended or added. Applicant respectfully traverses the rejections.

Claims 1-3, 6,7, 15, 18-22, 28, 31-33, 48-52, 55,56,57 and 68 stand rejected  
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) based on U.S. Publication no. 2002/0046299 of Lefeber et al.  
("Lefeber").

Claim 1 recites:

1. A mobile communication device comprising:  
a telephony unit to process telephony signals and to receive a

signal indicating an incoming call over a wireless link, the signal including Caller-ID information; and

**a browser to enable a user to access and navigate hypermedia information, and further to receive the Caller-ID information from the telephony unit in response to the incoming call and, in response to receiving the Caller-ID information, to execute a predetermined action based on the Caller-ID information.**  
(Emphasis added.)

Lefebvre does not disclose or even suggest a browser that receives Caller-ID information, or that such a browser, in response to receiving the Caller-ID information, executes a predetermined action based on the Caller-ID information. The Examiner incorrectly contends that this limitation is disclosed in Lefebvre at fig. 4; pages 7-8, paragraphs 59-61, 64-66 and 70 (see Office Action, page 2, item 2).

Lefebvre does disclose that the mobile phone receives Caller-ID information and that the mobile phone includes a browser. However, there is no disclosure or suggestion that the browser receives, or has any use for, the Caller-ID information. In Lefebvre, an alert is triggered by the Caller-ID information before the browser is invoked, or at least before the browser is invoked in relation to the alert. Once the alert is displayed to the user, no further use is made of the Caller-ID information.

In response to the alert, the user invokes the browser, if the browser is not already running. However, the browser itself merely performs conventional browser functions, such as retrieving a web page. The browser does not use the Caller-ID information. Lefebvre states, "Preferably, the user's mobile phone is also web-enabled and is configured with the browser's homepage (startup page) set to an Internet URL having the dynamic hyperlink. . . . In this manner, the user could upon receiving the alert simply start their phone's web browser to be automatically linked to the appropriate information that triggered the alert." Page 8, paragraph 61. "If the user is not already

online, the user reacts to the alert by depressing a button on the phone that launches the browser to connect to the Internet.” Page 8, paragraph 68 (emphasis added).

Thus, Lefeber does not disclose that the browser has any knowledge of the alert or the Caller-ID information which triggered the alert. Hence, there would be no motivation, based on the disclosure of Lefeber or the other art of record, to provide Caller-ID information to the browser.

Therefore, claim 1 is not anticipated by Lefeber, nor is it obvious based on Lefeber. Independent claims 20, 31 and 50 recite limitations similar to those in claim 1 discussed above, and in at least some cases, additional limitations. Therefore, these claims are also patentable over the cited art for similar reasons.

Regarding the rejection of independent claim 69 under § 103, note that claim 69 also recites limitations similar to those in claim 1 discussed above, and additional limitations. Therefore, the cited combination of Lefeber and Fleming III fails to disclose all of the limitations of claim 69. Therefore, claim 69 is also patentable over the cited art.